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STANDING UP FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS: SALVUCCI, RAWLINGS, AND THE
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY
The initial inquiry a court must make before considering a motion to suppress
evidence based on an unreasonable search and seizure is whether the individual has
standing under the fourth amendment. This Note examines the historical develop-
ment of the standing doctrines leading to the reasonable expectation o/privacy test
adopted by the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois. The Note also ident[fes the
problems created by the Court'sfar-reaching application of this test. The author
concludes that the overall effect of recent decisions may be to limit the number of
defendants able to assert /ourth amendment claims, since suppression hearing testi-
mony may be admissible against a defendant for impeachment purposes should a
defendant choose to testfy on his or her own behalf The author's conclusion is
predicated on the belief that thefactors comprising the reasonable expectation of
privacy test are vague and shfting and the notion .that property rights have been
abandoned in determining fourth amendment interests.
INTRODUCTION
THE FOURTH amendment to the United States Constitution is
the primary source for the fundamental guarantees of privacy
and personal security from governmental intrusion.' The amend-
ment reads in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... -2 To assert a
fourth amendment claim to suppress evidence obtained through
an allegedly illegal search, an individual must prove that his or
her personal fourth amendment rights have been violated.3 Tra-
ditionally, this initial inquiry has been known as standing.4
1. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948). See generaly Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 607 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The amendment originated as a protection against the history of executive abuse of
search and seizure in both the American colonies and in England before the revolution.
Stengel, The Background ofthe Fourth Amendment to the Constitution ofthe United States, 3
U. RiCH. L. REv. 278, 298 (1969). For a general history of the fourth amendment, see
Katz, Reflections on Search and Seizure and Illegally Seized Evidence in Canada and the
United States, 3 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 103 (1980); Stengel, supra.
3. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
4. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), however, the Court attempted to analyze
these issues in terms of substantive fourth amendment theory rather than standing. The
term "standing" will be used in this Note for purposes of clarity. See note 133 infra and
accompanying text.
RESONABLE EXPECTATION OF PPIM CY
Standing to assert a fourth amendment claim is fundamentally
different from the standing requirements of justiciability.' Pre-
sumably, a defendant could meet the basic justiciability require-
ment simply by demonstrating an interest in the incriminating
nature of the evidence which the government seeks to admit.6 Ob-
taining standing under the fourth amendment, however, is more
burdensome. Since the historical purpose of that amendment was
to protect an individual's property interests from governmental
search and seizure7 and that purpose has evolved more recently to
protect primarily privacy interests,' a defendant seeking standing
under the fourth amendment must demonstrate that these inter-
ests-property and privacy-have been invaded. In recent cases,
however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the fourth
amendment protects exclusively privacy interests and has aban-
doned its historical emphasis on property rights.9
The modem standing tests originated with the automatic
standing rules of Jones v. United States.'0 In Jones, the Supreme
Court held that an individual charged with a crime of possession
automatically had standing to challenge a search and seizure of
items which were essential to proving the government's case."
The Court held, alternatively, that anyone legitimately on the
premises at the time of the search would have standing to chal-
lenge that search.' 2 These rules attempted to eliminate the confu-
sion created by the lower court's application of rules from the
common law of private property to determine standing.13
In Simmons v. United States, 4 the Court expanded the ration-
ale of Jones and created a procedural protection for a defendant's
5. Kuhns, The Concept of Personal 4ggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing
Cases, 65 IowA L. REv. 493,494 n.12 (1980). The usual standard for justiciability standing
is "that the litigants have sufficient stake in the outcome of a controversy to ensure that all
relevant considerations will be fully aired." Id., see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432-35 (1952). See generall Scott, Standing in
the Supreme Courti-4 Fundamental Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 670, 675-77 (1973).
6. See Kuhns, supra note 5, at 494 n.12.
7. See notes 42-68 infra and accompanying text. Cf. note 2 supra, which provides
the historical background to the amendment.
8. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
9. Eg., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 105; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978).
10. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
11. Id. at 264.
12. Id. at 265.
13. See notes 69-94 infra and accompanying text.
14. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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suppression hearing testimony. This protection applies even
where the defendant is not charged with a crime of possession and
is not legitimately on the premises at the time of the search.15 Un-
der Simmons, a defendant's testimony at a hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and
seizure is inadmissible at trial in the government's case in chief.' 6
The Simmons protection is the primary protection left to fourth
amendment defendants today.17
In Rakas v. Illinois,'8 the Court overruled the second half of
the Jones decision which provided standing to anyone legitimately
on the premises at the time of a search. Instead, the Court
adopted the test from Katz v. United States19 which requires the
defendant to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched."0 This test, adopted from Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Katz, requires the defendant .to show an actual subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in the place searched which a majority
of society would recognize as reasonable.2 '
With its decisions in Savucci v. United States2 and Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 23 the Court completely reworked the fourth amend-
ment standing doctrine established in Jones.24 In SaIvucci, the
Court overruled that part of Jones which had given automatic
standing to defendants charged with possessory crimes.2 5 Instead,
the Court adopted the Rakas approach which requires a defend-
ant to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched. 6 In Rawlings, the Court held that property rights are
no longer determinative of fourth amendment interests. To pre-
vail, a defendant must establish a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the place searched. If the defendant cannot demonstrate
such an expectation, no unreasonable governmental intrusion has
occurred.27
In this Note, the author will begin by discussing the historical
15. See notes 95-111 infra and accompanying text.
16. 390 U.S. at 394.
17. See notes 103-11 infra and accompanying text.
18. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. See notes 112-70 infra and accompanying text.
21. 389 U.S. 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
23. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
24. See notes 171-209 infra and accompanying text.
25. 448 U.S. at 85.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 106.
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development of the standing doctrines which culminated in the
Jones decision.2 8 The modem standing doctrine, as represented
by Jones and Simmons, then will be analyzed.29 Furthermore, the
author will discuss Rakas, concentrating on the Court's analysis of
standing and its adaptation of the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test.30 Finally, the author will examine the extension of
Rakas in Saivuci 3 1 and the Court's far-reaching application of
the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Rawlings.32
In conclusion, the author will isolate three specific problems
created by the Court's new approach to standing. First, the gov-
ernment may use a defendant's suppression hearing testimony to
impeach his or her testimony at trial.3 Second, the courts have
adopted a mechanistic approach to the determination of fourth
amendment standing because the factors comprising the reason-
able expectation of privacy test are vague and shifting.34 Finally,
the Court has eliminated the historical underpinnings of previous
fourth amendment analysis by abandoning property rights as de-
terminative of fourth amendment standing." If these three
problems which stem from the application of the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy tests are viewed collectively, the result is a
narrowing of fourth amendment rights.
I. STANDING
The preliminary inquiry which a court must make before it
will consider a motion to suppress evidence based on an unreason-
able search and seizure is whether the individual filing the motion
has standing.36 In the federal courts, this inquiry begins by ascer-
taining whether the defendant is a "person aggrieved" by an un-
reasonable search or seizure.3 ' It generally is accepted that:
In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful
28. See notes 36-68 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 69-111 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 112-70 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 171-92 infra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 193-210 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 211-28 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 229-40 tnfra and accompanying text.
35. See notes 241-51 infra and accompanying text.
36. Butsee People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). California requires
only a modified version of the standing tests used in the federal courts. For a discussion of
the California standard, see Note, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California, 24 STAN.
L. REV. 947 (1972).
37. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 128 n.2.
An individual may raise the reasonableness of a search and/or seizure in a motion to
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search and seizure' one must have been a victim of a search or
seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distin-
guished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of
evidence gathered as a consequence of a search and seizure di-
rected at someone else.38
Standing confers the right to challenge unreasonable govern-
ment conduct under the fourth amendment. The illegality of the
search and subsequent suppression of evidence are factual deter-
minations made after standing is decided. 9 Standing, therefore,
acts as a gatekeeper for challenges of searches and seizures.' This
preliminary inquiry into standing prevents individuals who have
not been harmed by a search from questioning the reasonableness
of the search. Standing thus becomes the courts' most important
tool for controlling and limiting the number of individuals eligible
to assert fourth amendment claims.41
A. The Historical Background of Standing
The earliest standing tests-collectively known as the trespass
doctrine-were based solely on the relative strength of one's pos-
sessory or property interest in the items seized or the property
searched.42 Many of the subtle distinctions of property law were
imported to standing analysis.4 3 These distinctions, which devel-
oped as a means of determining an individual's interests in prop-
erty as compared to the interests of other individuals, proved
cumbersome and confusing when applied to an individual's right
to avoid unreasonable search and seizure. Under the trespass doc-
trine, possession, not title, was the most important factor in deter-
mining standing."
In its purest form, the trespass doctrine stands for the proposi-
tion that an unreasonable search and seizure only can be chal-
suppress the evidence before trial. The court may direct a hearing on the issues before trial
or defer determination of the issues until the trial. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41"(f) and 12(b).
38. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
39. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 4mendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 360-61
(1974).
40. See generally White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1970).
41. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 227-30 (1973); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-74 (1969); Duntile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use
of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 1,
29-30 (1971); White & Greenspan, supra note 40, at 335.
42. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Edwards, Standing
to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471 (1952).
43. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 265-66.
44. Edwards, supra note 42, at 490.
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lenged by the "owner, lessee, or lawful occupant of the premises
searched. ' 4- The doctrine's name originated from the concept
that fourth amendment protections are triggered by a government
official or law enforcement officer's physical trespass onto a per-
son's real property.46 This rule was interpreted strictly in Coon v.
United States47 where the defendant leased a small building
which he used as both a home and a whiskey distillery. Prohibi-
tion officers searched the building without a warrant and discov-
ered containers of whiskey.48 Holding that the defendant lacked
standing to challenge the legality of the search, the court denied
his motion to suppress the testimony of the prohibition officers
involved in the search. The Court reasoned that although the de-
fendant leased the building, his occupancy was "merely incident"
to the manufacture of intoxicating liquor, and therefore, the build-
ing could not be regarded as his home.49 Thus, the defendant
could not challenge the legality of the search because his rights
had not been invaded.
Contrary to the strict view taken in Coon, other courts have
adopted rather broad interpretations of the trespass doctrine. In
United States v. Stappenback,50 for example, papers were taken
from the defendant's coat during a prohibition raid while the coat
was hanging in a building owned by another individual. The de-
fendant was not on the premises at the time of the search.5' Ap-
plying a theory of constructive possession, the court reasoned that
the coat remained in defendant's possession because he was its
owner, even though he was absent from the premises at the time
of the search. 2
Although Coon and Stappenback are not in direct conflict, the
divergence in the breadth of their respective interpretations indi-
cates the application of two separate rules. In Stappenback, con-
structive possession alone was deemed sufficient to confer
standing; whereas in Coon, the defendant was denied standing
even though he had possession through a valid lease and was pres-
ent at the time of the search. In addition to these broad differ-
45. Coon v. United States, 36 F.2d 164, 165 (10th Cir. 1929).
46. Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and the Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion after Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709 (1977).
47. 36 F.2d at 164.
48. Id. at 165.
49. Id.
50. 61 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1932).
51. Id. at 956.
52. Id. at 957.
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ences in interpretation, the courts also evidence many directly
conflicting interpretations of the trespass doctrine. While standing
was allowed for constructive possession in Stappenback, for exam-
ple, other courts have held that the owners of premises occupied
by another do not have standing to challenge a search of those
premises. 3 As a result of these contrarieties, it became possible
that if neither the owner54 nor the lessee55 had standing, no one
would have standing to challenge a clearly unreasonable search. 6
Such distinctions led to confusion for both the courts and law en-
forcement officials.
To alleviate the confusion which eventually surrounded the
trespass doctrine, courts began to apply a constitutionally pro-
tected areas test.57 This test recognized that certain areas pre-
sumptively were protected from government intrusion58 unless the
plain view doctrine applied.5 9 The constitutionally protected ar-
eas test, like the trespass doctrine, also was difficult to apply be-
cause of its idiosyncrasies. Although it was certain that a home
constituted a constitutionally protected area,6 ° whereas an open
field did not,61 there were few other areas which clearly were con-
stitutionally protected. To determine whether an area was deserv-
ing of such protection, it was compared to areas which already
had been declared protected by the courts. In determining that a
telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area, for exam-
ple, one court compared it to a taxi and an apartment.62 Another
court compared a telephone booth to a home, an office and a taxi
and held that it was not a constitutionally protected area.63
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the constitutionally pro-
53. See, e.g., Schnitzer v. United States, 77 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1935); Cantrell v.
United States, 15 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1926).
54. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
55. Coon v. United States, 36 F.2d at 165.
56. For a catalogue of the many variations in the trespass doctrine, see Edwards, supra
note 42, at 472-80.
57. See Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Constitutional Development from
Olmsteadto Katz, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 513, 516, 523-26 (1968). The courts developed the
concept of constitutionally protected areas to avoid overruling previous trespass cases. Id.
58. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
59. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58
(1924). Under the plain view doctrine, items clearly visible to government officials are not
protected from search and seizure since the actions of officials in seizing plainly visible
objects would not be unreasonable. 265 U.S. at 59.
60. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 390.
61. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. at 59.
62. United States v. Stone, 232 F. Supp. 396, 398 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
63. United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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tected areas test in Katz v. United States.6' The Court noted:
"The correct solution [to] Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by the incantation of the phrase 'constitu-
tionally protected area.' "65 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
reasoned that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,"" and that the doctrine is not a "talismanic solution to
. . . Fourth Amendment problem[s]." 67 The Court in Katz noted
by example that if a person knowingly exposes objects to the pub-
lic, even within the confines of a private home, that individual
may not claim fourth amendment protection.6 Before it was re-
jected, however, the constitutionally protected areas doctrine fu-
eled the confusion already created by the trespass doctrine.
B. The Modern Standing Doctrine
The Supreme Court first considered the standing doctrines in
Jones v. United States.69 The defendant, Jones, was staying at a
friend's apartment when officials searched the apartment and
seized narcotics. Jones sought to prevent the introduction of the
seized narcotics into evidence, arguing that the warrant lacked a
showing of probable cause.7° Jones testified that the apartment
belonged to a friend, that he had the friend's permission to stay
there and that he slept there "maybe a night. 71 In addition,
Jones had a key to the apartment and kept clothing there.72
At the suppression hearing, the government questioned the de-
fendant's standing to challenge the legality of the search because
64. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
65. Id. at 350.
66. Id. at 351.
67. Id. n.9.
68. Id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) and United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
69. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Justice Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker,
and Stewart. Justice Douglas joined in the Court's standing decision but dissented from
the determination that the warrant was supported by probable cause.
70. Id. at 258-59. The fourth amendment requires a showing of probable cause to
support a warrant. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the seminal decision
defining probable cause, the Supreme Court stated that if police had "reasonable cause to
believe" that criminally related objects are in a given location, they have grounds to obtain
a warrant to search that place, or under special circumstances, to search without a warrant.
Id. at 175. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 358-60; see also United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
71. 362 U.S. at 259.
72. Id.
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he had no possessory interest in the apartment.73 Since Jones
failed to admit possession of the narcotics and did not have a suffi-
cient possessory interest in the place searched, his motion to sup-
press the evidence was denied for lack of standing.74 Jones
subsequently was convicted on charges of possession of narcot-
ics.75 Although the court of appeals upheld the lower court's con-
viction,76 the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded
the case for proceedings in conformity with its newly enunciated
standing rules.77
These rules reflected a two-pronged standing test: Standing
would be conferred automatically either when the defendant was
charged with a crime of possession7 8 or when the defendant was
legitimately on the searched premises. 9 In a multi-step analysis,
the court noted that the standing requirements formerly used by
the lower courts placed the defendant charged with a crime of
possession in a dilemma. The defendant either had to admit pos-
session to gain standing, in which case the admission could be
used against him or her at trial, or the defendant could choose not
to suppress the evidence and forego his or her fourth amendment
rights.8 0 Where possession is the major element of a crime, this
admission requirement forced a defendant to commit perjury by
testifying that he or she did in fact have possession in order to
present a defense. Such an admission, however, most likely would
be sufficient evidence to result in a conviction.8'
The Court also reasoned that the old standing tests allowed the
73. Id.
74. Id. at 258.
75. Id. Jones was convicted under the specific provisions of the Act of Jan. 17, 1914,
ch. 9, 38 Stat. 275 (formerly 21 U.S.C. § 174), and the Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A
Stat. 3 (formerly 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a)).
76. Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
77. 362 U.S. at 273.
78. Id. at 264.
79. Id. at 265.
80. Id. at 263-64. Instances where standing admissions were used against a defendant
at trial include the following: Accardo v. United States, 247 F.2d 568, 569-70 (D.C. Cir.
1957); United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1954); Scoggins v. United
States, 202 F.2d 211, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236, 238
(4th Cir. 1946). Contra United States v. Dean, 50 F.2d 905, 906 (D. Mass. 1931) (motion to
suppress allowed where defendant could not claim possession because he only leased the
premises).
81. 362 U.S. at 261-62. The Court apparently thought that when an allegation of
possession was not involved, there was no harm in forcing a defendant to claim possession
of a seized object to gain standing. This aspect of the earlier test, therefore, presumably
was not affected by the decision.
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government to engage in an untenable contradiction. While the
government's case in chief rested on the defendant's possession of
narcotics at the time of his arrest, "[tihe fruits of that search, upon
which the conviction depends, were admitted into evidence on the
ground that [the defendant] did not have possession of the narcot-
ics at that time."'82 The Court stated that this type of contradiction
was highly inconsistent with fair standards for the administration
of criminal justice.8 3 Thus, the Court concluded that in cases
where the indictment alleged possession, the defendant was auto-
matically "revealed as 'a person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure.' "84
Finally, the Court in Jones disregarded what it classified as
"subtle distinctions, developed. . . by the common law. . . of
private property." 5 The Court noted that these rules were shaped
by distinctions "whose validity is largely historical"8' 6 and that
these property rules were not formed with reference to the consti-
tutional safeguards they were meant to protect.8 7 An individual's
rights vis-A-vis those of others are not comparable to such rights
vis-A-vis the government. An individual never has the right to
trespass on another's property, but the government may trespass if
its agents act reasonably.88 Furthermore; the fact that the Court
had rejected property distinctions in other areas of the law, such
as admiralty,89 indicated that there was no overwhelming reason
to retain such distinctions in the area of search and seizure. Ap-
parently the Court thought that these property concepts were not
so embedded jurisprudentially to withstand a conflict with the fair
administration of justice.
The Jones decision represented a breakthrough in the law of
fourth amendment standing because it eliminated much of the
confusion created by the early property doctrines. ° While it was
unclear how the rules in Jones should be applied in subsequent
situations, 9' lower courts interpreted the decision very broadly.92
82. Id. at 263.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 264, quoting FED. R. CUM. PRO 41(e).
85. 362 U.S. at 266.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 388.
89. 362 U.S. at 266.
90. See Note, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 14 Sw. L. REv. 521,
525 (1960); Note, Lawful Presence on Illegally Searched Premises as Sufficient Basisfor Mo-
lion to Suppress Evidence Seized Thereon, 14 vAND. L. REv. 418, 421 (1960).
91. The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 95, 151-53 (1960).
92. See, e.g., Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 537 (1st Cir. 1968); United States v.
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Several contingencies, for example, such as the standing of an ab-
sentee owner or the owner of property seized from a third party,
were left open for interpretation.93 It was not until almost two
decades after its formulation, however, that the Jones test came
under fire as being too broad a test for fourth amendment rights.94
The next major case in which the Court considered standing
was Simmons v. United States.9 The factual circumstances of
Simmons involved the investigation of an armed robbery during
which police conducted a warrantless search of a suspect's
mother's house. During that search, the police discovered two
suitcases belonging to the defendant who was another suspect.
One of the suitcases contained a gun holster, a sack similar to the
one used in the robbery, and bill wrappers from the bank which
had been robbed.96 At trial, the defendant sought to suppress this
evidence. The Jones test arguably did not apply since the defend-
ant was neither charged with a crime of possession nor legiti-
mately present on the premises at the time of the search.97 As the
Court observed, "[t]he only ...way in which he could [have]
found standing to object to the admission of the suitcase was to
testify that he was its owner."98
The Court recognized that the defendant in this case faced the
same dilemma as that faced by the defendant in Jones-admit
possession and incriminate himself or forego his fourth amend-
ment rights. 99 Although the defendant was not charged with a
crime of possession, admitting possession of the suitcase would
Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942, 944-45 (N.D. Cal. 1963). But see United States v. Konigsberg,
336 F.2d 844, 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964) (Jones held applicable only
where mere possession is sufficient to convict).
93. The Supreme Court, supra note 91, at 151. These situations have created some of
the subsequent interpretive problems of.Jones. Another interpretive problem is illustrated
by Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), which examined the standing of the
owner of property seized from a third party. For a discussion of Simmons, see notes
95-111 infra and accompanying text.
94. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
95. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Justice Harlan delivered the majority opinion and was joined
by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, and Fortas. Jus-
tice Black filed a separate opinion dissenting from the Court's standing decision. Justice
White joined portions of the majority opinion but also joined the dissenting portions of
Justice Black's opinion.
96. Id. at 380.
97. Id. at 390-91.
98. Id. at 391.
99. See notes 78-84 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 31:656
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
place him at the scene of an armed robbery."° The Court rea-
soned that the defendant would be deterred from asserting his
fourth amendment claim if his testimony at the suppression hear-
ing were admissible against him at trial.1 01
The Supreme Court noted, alternatively, that forcing the de-
fendant to choose between his fourth amendment rights and self-
incrimination violated his fifth amendment right against such self-
incrimination. The Court stated that a defendant's testimony at a
suppression hearing arguably may be voluntary, since the defen-
dant would be forced to forfeit only the benefit of testifying in his
own behalf; when the benefit is one conferred by the Bill of
Rights, however, an "undeniable tension is created."102 To avoid
forcing the defendant to trade one constitutional right for another,
the Court held that a defendant's standing testimony at a suppres-
sion hearing is not admissible against him or her at trial. 0 3
On its face, Simmons appears to eliminate the dilemma con-
fronting the Court in Jones'°4 since it offers the defendant com-
plete protection from the use of his or her suppression hearing
testimony in the government's case-in-chief l In the absence of
the protection offered by Jones, however, the Simmons protection
could be potentially meaningless. Since Simmons only provides a
use immunity for a defendant's suppression hearing testimony, the
government still could defeat the defendant's standing by denying
him or her a possessory interest for purposes of the search. At
100. 390 U.S. at 391. The Court acknowledged that because an admission would not
prove an element of the crime, as with possession, a serious dilemma was not presented.
Id.
101. Id. at 392-93.
102. Id. at 394.
103. Id. Justice Black stated in a dissenting opinion that only a few defendants would
be deterred from asserting a fourth amendment claim. Id. at 395-97. This small risk is
outweighed by the value of allowing the government to use such testimony at trial. Justice
Black's argument rests on the assumption that in these "marginal" cases the defendant is
almost always guilty. Id. at 397. This position, however, ignores the fact that even guilty
defendants should be afforded due process. Moreover, the assumption of guilt seems un-
founded since the defendant has not been convicted at this stage of the proceeding.
Concerning the majority's fifth amendment rationale, Justice Black stated that the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination is waived by the defendant's voluntary testimony at the
suppression hearing. Id. at 397-98 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. White & Greenspan, supra note 40, at 338-44. See also Steps, Standing to Object
to Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 Mo. L. REv. 575, 585 (1969); Note, Testimony
Gi'en in Support of a Motion to Suppress Evidence Not Admissible at Trial, 18 AM. U.L.
Rnv. 208 (1968).
105. 390 U.S. at 390.
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trial, however, the prosecution could assert that the defendant
possessed the seized items to prove the defendant's guilt.
The only protection offered by Simmons is that a defendant's
testimony at the suppression hearing will not be admissible
against him or her at trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. Un-
der Jones, however, a defendant charged by the government with
possession would have automatic standing to challenge the unrea-
sonable government conduct, and the government would not have
the opportunity to deny the fact of possession. Even if the govern-
ment did not succeed in defeating the suppression motion under
Simmons, the possibility that a defendant's suppression testimony
could reveal incriminating evidence that would aid the prosecu-
tion in the preparation of its case or that the defendant's testimony
could be used at trial for impeachment purposes is not accounted
for in the decision." 6 A defendant, however, would not be com-
mitting perjury by relying on the Jones automatic standing test
since it is the government's assertion of possession, not the defend-
ant's, that results in automatic standing.
10 7
The Simmons Court did not appear to be overruling or limit-
ing Jones. °8 Rather, the Court stated that it was expanding the
rationale of Jones to apply to defendants not charged with crimes
of possession. 10 9 Since the government does not allege possession
as an element of the crime in such a situation, the dilemma is not
as severe and the protection afforded need not be as complete as
when such possession is alleged." 0 The Simmons decision should
be read as augmenting the Jones decision. Simmons, therefore,
does not offer a basis for rejecting the dilemma rationale of Jones
but rather strengthens and adds credibility to that reasoning."'
C. The Recent Reevaluation of Standing
The Jones decision came under close scrutiny in the late
1970's. In Rakas v. Illinois,"I2 the Court specifically overruled the
test in Jones which granted standing to anyone legitimately on the
106. Id.
107. 362 U.S. at 263.
108. 390 U.S. at 390-91.
109. Id. at 391-92.
110. Id.
111. Subsequently, in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1973), the Court indi-
cated that Simmons might undercut Jones.
112. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun joined. Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, filed a separate concurring opinion to stress that the
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searched premises.1 3 The defendants in Rakas, while fleeing
from the scene of an armed robbery, were stopped by police and
ordered out of the car in which they were passengers.'1 14 Two po-
lice officers searched the vehicle and discovered a sawed-off shot-
gun under the front seat and a box of rifle shells in the locked
glove compartment. Although the defendants did not own the
car, and the owner was not present at the time of the search, the
defendants sought to suppress this evidence on the grounds that
the search violated the fourth amendment.1 5 At the suppression
hearing, the defendants did not assert that they owned the shotgun
or the shells.1 16 Consequently, the Court denied those individuals
standing to suppress the evidence.1 17
The defendants attempted to invoke the "legitimately on the
premises" standard enunciated in Jones by analogizing their pres-
ence in the automobile to Jones' presence in his friend's apart-
ment. ' The Court, however, limiting Jones to its facts, con-
cluded that Jones "stands for the unremarkable position that a
person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than
his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from
unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place."I 19 Accord-
ing to the Court, the grant of standing under the Jones test was
"too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment
rights" since Jones conceivably would confer standing upon an
individual who arrives on the premises one minute before a search
and leaves one minute after the search. 2 ' The Court's argument
is somewhat tenuous, however, because it is difficult to imagine
how anything seized by the police in such circumstances could be
connected to a stranger or casual visitor to the premises. The
existence of some additional contact with the premises could pro-
expectation of privacy standard should not be tied to property concepts. Justice White filed
a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined.
113. Id. at 142. The alternative rule of Jones, granting standing to defendants charged
with possessory offenses, was not overruled. For an examination of that test, see notes
82-84 supra and accompanying text.
114. For an analysis of the impact of Rakas on automobile search cases, see Allen &
Schaefer, Great Expectations: Privacy Rights and Automobiles, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 99
(1979); Comment, Possession and Presumptions: The Plight of the Passenger Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1027 (1980); Comment, Rakas v. Illinois: The
Fourth Amendment and Standing Revisited, 40 LA. L. REv. 962 (1980).
115. 439 U.S. at 130.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 131.
118. Id. at 140-41.
119. Id. at 142.
120. Id.
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vide adequate grounds for a defendant to challenge the legality of
the search.121
In place of the Jones test, the Court in Rakas held that to es-
tablish standing a defendant must prove he or she had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the place searched. 22  This
reasonable expectation of privacy test first was developed in Katz
v. United States.1 23 In Katz, police had attached an electronic lis-
tening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone
booth from which the defendant placed calls relaying gambling
information. 4 When the defendant attempted to suppress the
tapes of his conversations, the government argued that there had
been no violation of the fourth amendment because "'[t]here was
no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the peti-
tioner].' ",125 In addition to rejecting the constitutionally protected
areas test, 126 the Court dealt with the scope of the right of privacy
under the fourth amendment. The Court refused to recognize that
the fourth amendment encompasses a general right to privacy;12 7
instead, it stated that the fourth amendment only protects privacy
in relation to certain kinds of governmental intrusion.2 8  The
Court noted, however, that the amendment protects not only this
specific privacy interest, but also property interests and personal
security.12
9
121. For an example of additional contact, see id. at 142 n. 11 (seizure of personal prop-
erty). The fact that additional contact with the searched premises will give rise to standing
to challenge the search is especially true because the Court did not expressly overrule Jones
and posited that the factual determination of standing in Jones was correct. Id. at 141.
The defendants in Rakas argued that since they were the object or target of the search, they
should be allowed to establish standing. Id. at 132-33. Although this theory has been
presented on previous occasions-United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976); United States v. Cobb, 432 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969)--it never has been generally accepted by
the Court. The theory was rejected expressly in Rakas and in Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). For a discussion of the target
theory, see Gutterman, "4 Person Aggrieved"s Standing to Suppress Illegally Seized Evi-
dence in Transition, 23 EMORY L.J. 111 (1974).
122. 439 U.S. at 143.
123. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
124. Id. at 348.
125. Id. at 349 (quoting the decision of the court of appeals, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir.
1966) (emphasis added). Although the Court does not call Katz a standing case, its analy-
sis of the constitutionally protected areas test and the privacy issues indicates that the sub-
stantive issues are the same as in standing cases.
126. For a discussion of this aspect of Katz, see notes 64-68 supra and accompanying
text.
127. 389 U.S. at 350.
128. Id.
129. Id. "[The fourth amendment's] protections go further [than individual privacy]
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan enunciated what sub-
sequently would become the rule of Katz. According to Justice
Harlan, "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable.' "30 It is important to note, however, that
Justice Harlan's statement of the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy standard is couched in references to property.1 3' Thus, while
Katz established a privacy standard for the protection of fourth
amendment rights, it was not formulated to the exclusion of prop-
erty interests.
Before applying the privacy test of Katz to the facts of Rakas,
the Court addressed the procedural posture of the Rakas defen-
dants' standing claim.' 32 In making that inquiry, the Court rea-
soned that the tests to determine standing under the fourth
amendment related to the scope of an individual's rights under
that amendment.1 33 The Court also noted that by discussing these
issues in a substantive setting, it could avoid confusing fourth
amendment standing concepts with standing for justiciability, a
foreseeable problem since the term "standing" traditionally refers
to justiciability issues under Article III of the Constitution.134 Be-
cause an individual raising a motion to suppress evidence under
the fourth amendment invariably satisfies even the strictest jus-
ticiability standing test,' 35 the additional fourth amendment in-
quiry is superflous from a traditional standing point of view. The
issue of whether an individual has a claim which is cognizable
under the fourth amendment, therefore, is largely one of substan-
tive fourth amendment law and is unrelated to standing in the
traditional sense.'
3 6
The decision to abandon the rubric of standing transformed
what was formerly a procedural issue into the primary substantive
and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." Id. See Amsterdam, supra note 39, at
385.
130. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. 439 U.S. at 138.
133. Id. at 139. Although the Court discarded the term "standing" in fourth amend-
ment cases, it subsequently has readopted the language because lower courts continued to
use the word. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
134. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
136. 439 U.S. at 139.
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element of the fourth amendment claim.137 The Court acknowl-
edged that although this change should not have a significant im-
pact on the analysis of the issues since the same tests would be
applied, the quality of such analysis would be improved. Dealing
with the issues under the guise of standing undercut their impor-
tance and belied their substantive impact. Thus, the Court recog-
nized that there was an artificiality in analyzing the issues in terms
of standing1 38 and concluded that "by frankly recognizing that
this aspect of the analysis belongs more properly under the head-
ing of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the
heading of standing we think the decision of the issue will rest on
sounder logical footing."' 39
The defendants in Rakas were found not to have a "legiti-
mate" expectation of privacy for several reasons. 40 First, they
failed to assert a "property" or "possessory" interest in either the
automobile in which they were travelling or the seized items. 14 1
Second, their "legitimate presence" in the auto was inconsequen-
tial since the "legitimately on the premises" test was rejected as
being too broad a test of fourth amendment rights.'4 2 Using the
example of the "casual visitor,"'143 the Court concluded that the
legitimately on the premises test, much like the constitutionally
protected areas test, was merely "a label placed by the courts on
results which have not been subjected to careful analysis."'"
Finally, in determining that the defendants did not have a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in the automobile, the Court re-
ferred to previous automobile cases.' 45 Since the Katz decision,
the Court has found a decreased expectation of privacy in
automobiles for a variety of reasons. In United States v. Chad-
wick, 146 for example, the Court listed such factors as the registra-
tion and publicly mandated inspection of automobiles as well as
137. Bell, Raising Fourth Amendment Claims After Rakas, Salvucci and Rawlings, 7
SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 61, 62 (1980).
138. 439 U.S. at 139.
139. Id. at 140.
140. In Rakas, the Court consistently used the term "legitimate" rather than "reason-
able." This rubric also is used in Smith, Salvucci, and Rawlings.
141. 439 U.S. at 148. The defendants claimed that they were not asked whether they
had an interest of this type in the seized property and consequently requested a remand for
further proceedings on this matter. Id. at 130-31 n.l.
142. Id. at 148.
143. See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
144. 439 U.S. at 148.
145. Id.
146. 433 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the licensing of drivers as some of the factors contributing to the
decreased expectation of privacy in such vehciles. 147 In Cardwell
v. Lewis,141 the Court stated: "One has a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and
it seldom serves as one's residence or as a repository of personal
effects .... It travels public thoroughfares where both its occu-
pants and its contents are in plain view." 149 Viewing these cases
as controlling, the Court in Rakas concluded that the decreased
expectation of privacy and the absence of automobile ownership
were sufficient to defeat the defendants' expectation of privacy.150
Although the Court reaffirmed the rejection of subtle property
concepts announced in Jones, the majority seemed to define a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in terms of property interests.15 In
applying the expectation of privacy test to the facts in Rakas, the
Court noted that the defendants "asserted neither a property or
possessory interest. . . [and,]. . . cars are not to be treated iden-
tically with houses or apartments."' 52 The Court also stated that
while "a passenger qua passenger would not normally have a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy," 53 visitors might be able to "con-
test the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their
own property were seized during the search."' 54 The opinion
seems self-contradictory because of this emphasis on property in-
terests; while the Court rejected the property tests as a measure of
fourth amendment rights, it relied heavily on the lack of a posses-
sory right in deciding Rakas.'55 In Jones and Katz, the Court re-
jected the property tests because they created confusion regarding
fourth amendment standing.' 56 The Rakas court, however, ap-
pears to revive these tests and add another factor-the "legiti-
mate" expectation of privacy-to the confusion.
In adopting the expectation of privacy test, the Court placed
emphasis on Justice Harlan's requirement of a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as legiti-
147. Id. at 12-15.
148. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
149. Id. at 590.
150. 439 U.S. at 148-49. The Court apparently analogized the defendants to the casual
visitor discussed earlier. Id. at 142. See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
151. 439 U.S. at 143, 148. See Bell, supra note 137, at 62.
152. 439 U.S. at 148.
153. Id. at 148-49.
154. Id. at 142 n. 11; see The Supreme Court: 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 196, 202
n.53 (1980).
155. 439 U.S. at 142 n. 11; see Bell, supra note 137, at 62.
156. See notes 85-90 supra and accompanying text.
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mate.'5 7  The majority implied that because the Court had
recognized only a slight expectation of privacy in automobiles in
the past, the defendants in Rakas could not reasonably expect to
have privacy in their automobile.' 58 In Smith v. Maryland,59 the
Court explained more fully what constitutes a "legitimate" expec-
tation of privacy and held that while the defendant subjectively
expected privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, this expectation
was not "'one that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able.' ""6 The Court reasoned that since it is common knowledge
that the phone company records dialed numbers for the purposes
of billing and record keeping, an individual could not legitimately
expect those numbers to be private. 16  The standard, therefore,
apparently requires a court to determine whether a majority of the
individuals in society would hold the same expectation of privacy
as the defendant.
This standard has not been easy for the courts to apply. The
standard requires "a court to pinpoint a vague shifting and per-
haps illusory consensus."' 162 As one commentator noted, "lower
courts have recently identified privacy expectations in a taped pa-
per bag, a leather pouch, cardboard boxes, and a backpack, but
not in a taped Scrabble box, a toolbox, an unlatched knapsack, or
a closed but unsealed envelope."' 163 Despite the difficulty of appli-
cation, the requirement of a legitimate expectation of privacy
could suggest that formerly private areas may no longer be classi-
fied as such due to repeated government searches.164 This sugges-
tion is implicit in Rakas since the Court examined its previous
157. 439 U.S. at 148; see notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 145-50 supra and accompanying text.
159. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
160. Id. at 743 (quoting Justice Harlan's opinion in Katz). In Smith, the defendant was
accused of making obscene phone calls. Police, through the phone company, placed a pen
register on the defendant's line to monitor the numbers he dialed. The defendant sought to
suppress the numbers obtained through the use of the pen register. Id. at 737.
161. Id. at 742.
162. The Supreme Court, supra note 154, at 202.
163. Id. at 202-03 (footnotes omitted). The article refers to the following cases respec-
tively: United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979), adhered to in 615 F.2d 10 (2d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v.
Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1978); Wyss v. State, 262 Ark. 502, 558 S.W.2d 141 (1977);
State v. Sehrier, 283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979).
164. The Supreme Court, supra note 154, at 203. The commentator also observed that
"Repeated invasions by credit bureaus, employers, and the like can lead persons to dis-
count most expectations as unreasonable, individual fears of a loss of privacy then become
self-fulfilling prophesies." Id.
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determinations of whether there existed an expectation of privacy
in an automobile, rather than considering whether the defendants
subjectively expected privacy from government intrusion.165
Thus, Smith indicates that despite contrary subjective expectations
of the defendant, the Court's consensus will prevail.166
The test employed in Rakas seems much narrower than the
test developed in Katz. Justice Harlan noted in his concurring
opinion in Katz that the "critical fact in this case [Katz] is that
'one who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume' that his conversation is not being intercepted."'' 67 Jus-
tice Harlan stated, however, that an individual having a conversa-
tion in the open would not have an expectation of privacy.168
Thus, by shutting the door, the phone booth temporarily became a
place where the defendant could expect privacy because the Court
believed a majority of the people in society would have identical
expectations. 169
In Rakas, the defendants had placed the items which subse-
quently were seized under a seat and in a locked glove compart-
ment.' 70 The items were not in plain view; they had been hidden
from public scrutiny as the defendant's conversation in Katz had
been hidden from such scrutiny. Although the Court in Katz
judged the tapes to be a violation of the defendants' fourth
amendment rights and thus properly suppressed, the search of the
automobile in Rakas was not held violative of the defendant's
constitutional rights. It is difficult, however, to distinguish the ex-
pectation of privacy in a phone booth-an enclosed public
place-from that of an automobile. It can be concluded, there-
fore, that the expectation of privacy test was applied more strictly
in Rakas than in Katz.
Recently, the Supreme Court further extended the application
of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. In United States v.
Salvucci,17' the defendant was indicted on several counts of pos-
session of stolen mail. The evidence supporting the indictment
165. 439 U.S. at 148.
166. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
167. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (brackets in original).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 439 U.S. at 130.
171. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, Stevens, Blackmun, and White joined.
Justice Marshall dissented from the decision and was joined by Justice Brennan.
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was discovered during the search of an apartment rented by the
mother of defendant's alleged accomplice. 7 2 The defendants
sought to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrant
was not supported by a sufficient showing of probable cause.' 73
The district court granted standing to challenge the search on the
basis of the Jones automatic standing test for possessory crimes 17 4
and eventually granted the defendants' motion to suppress. The
court of appeals affirmed this decision. 175 The Supreme Court re-
versed the decision below and specifically overruled the second
test of Jones which provided automatic standing for individuals
charged with crimes of possession.' 76 In its place, the Court ap-
plied the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. 177
In Salvucci, the Court initially observed that the dilemma
faced by the defendant in Jones was eliminated by its decision in
Simmons granting use immunity for a defendant's suppression
hearing testimony. 78 The Court concluded that because the Sim-
mons rule extended to nonpossessory defendants, it was broader
than the test in Jones and provided equal, if not more comprehen-
sive, protection. 179 The Court stated that because of its holding in
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 80 proof of possession or ownership no
longer would be required to obtain standing;' 8' instead, the prose-
cutor could assert, with legal consistency, that a defendant pos-
sessed or owned seized goods but did not have a fourth
amendment interest in them. 182 The Court concluded that posses-
sion alone, without a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
place searched, was insufficient to establish standing. 8 3
As Justice Marshall suggested in his dissent, testimony of the
defendant still could be used against him or her for impeachment
purposes.1i 4 If the defendant testified on his or her own behalf at
172. Id. at 85. Salvucci was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1976). One
of the principal elements of the offense is possession.
173. 448 U.S. at 85.
174. Id. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
175. See United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir. 1979).
176. 448 U.S. at 90-93.
177. Id. at 91-92.
178. Id. at 89-90; see text accompanying notes 104-11 supra.
179. 448 U.S. at 90.
180. Id. at 91.
181. Id. at 85; see The Supreme Court, supra note 154, at 198; text accompanying notes
202-05 infra.
182. 448 U.S. at 88-89.
183. Id. at 91-92.
184. Id. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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trial, any evidence from the suppression hearing could be used for
impeachment. 8 ' Under this circumstance, the dilemma of self-
incrimination would not be eliminated "unless he [is] prepared to
relinquish his constitutional right to testify in his own defense
.... ,s6 Justice Marshall also argued that the ability to cross-
examine a defendant at the suppression hearing provided a tacti-
cal advantage to the government. 1 7 The prosecution might elicit
additional incriminating evidence from the testimony which, even
if inadmissible at trial, would facilitate its strategy. Justice Mar-
shall concluded, therefore, that "[T]he furnishing of such a tactical
advantage should not be the price of asserting a Fourth Amend-
ment claim.' ' s8
The majority's emphasis in Salvucci on the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the place searched rather than on possessory
interests is a crucial diversion from its opinion in Rakas. The dic-
tum of the Court in Rakas indicated that an individual who did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched
still might have standing if he or she had a property interest in the
items seized. 89 SaIvucci, however, indicates that this possibility
no longer exists and, unless an individual has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the place searched, standing will not be con-
ferred.190 According to Rakas, a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place searched still is determined largely by an indi-
vidual's property or possessory interest in the place searched. 91
The effect of this anomaly is that "a bona fide possessory interest
in the thing seized is negated by a lack of privacy interest in the
place where the thing is located-a privacy to a large extent de-
fined by whether a right to possession of that place exists."1 92
In a companion case to SaIvucci, Rawlings v. Kentucky,193 the
Court engaged in its most restrictive interpretation of standing to
date. In Rawlings, the defendant was arrested for trafficking in
185. Id. See notes 212-28 infra and accompanying text.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
190. 448 U.S. at 91-92.
191. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
192. Bell, supra note 137, at 63.
193. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens and Powell joined. Justice Blackmun filed a
separate concurring opinion. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part in which Justice Stewart joined. Justice Marshall filed a separate dissenting
opinion in which Justice Brennan joined.
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and possession of controlled substances under Kentucky state law.
While the defendant was a guest at a friend's home, police arrived
with a warrant for the arrest of the homeowner. 194 The police
smelled marijuana smoke while looking for the owner and subse-
quently discovered marijuana seeds. The police detained the oc-
cupants at the house while one officer obtained a search warrant.
After the police officer returned with a warrant, the defendant and
a female companion were searched. The woman was forced to
disclose the contents of her purse which contained drugs owned
by the defendant. Although the defendant admitted ownership of
the drugs during the search, 1 95 he later sought to suppress the evi-
dence at trial, arguing that the warrant did not apply to the purse
and lacked a showing of probable cause.' 96 The trial court denied
the motion on the grounds that the warrant applied to the purse,
and, alternatively, that even if the search were illegal, the defend-
ant lacked standing to challenge it.'9 7 Both the court of appeals 9 8
and the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the defendant lacked
standing and affirmed the conviction. 199
The United States Supreme Court upheld these decisions, con-
cluding that Rawlings never had previous access to the purse, had
no right to exclude others from an examination of the purse, and,
because he had placed the drugs there hastily, had failed to take
normal precautions to preserve his privacy interests. 20° Based on
these facts, the Court ruled that the defendant could not have had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the purse.2 °'
The Court, however, still was faced with the problem that
Rawlings had admitted to possession of the seized items. In
Rakas, the Court indicated that an individual who admitted to
possession would have standing even in the absence of a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the place searched. 2°2 The Salvucci
court's language, although dictum, strongly suggests that even in
the presence of possession, an individual has no standing without
a sufficient expectation of privacy.203 In Rawlings, the Court con-
194. Id. at 100.
195. Id. at 101.
196. Id. at 102.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. 1979).
200. 448 U.S. at 105.
201. Id.
202. See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
203. See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
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cluded that even though the defendant owned the drugs and had
admitted to possession, if there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place searched, the defendant did not have stand-
ing.204 As the Court observed, "[h]ad defendant placed his drugs
in plain view, he would still have owned them, but he could not
claim any legitimate expectation of privacy."2 5
Justice Marshall dissented once again, arguing that the author-
ity cited by the majority supported the concept that ownership or
possession is sufficient to confer standing.206 Second, and more
fundamentally, Justice Marshall argued that implicit in the fourth
amendment is the protection of an individuars property inter-
ests.207 Furthermore, Justice Marshall noted that although the
Court in Jones discarded archaic property distinctions as defini-
tive tests for fourth amendment rights, it did not hold that prop-
erty interests were irrelevant to fourth amendment rights.20 '
Justice Marshall concluded that:
[Jones and Katz] expanded our view of the protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment by recognizing that privacy interests
are protected even if they do not arise from property rights.
But that recognition was never intended to exclude interests
that had historically been sheltered by the Fourth Amendment
from its protection .... Rejection of these finely drawn dis-
tinctions [of private property law] as irrelevant to the concerns
of the Fourth Amendment did not render property rights whol-
ly outside its protection .... 20'
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN STANDING
The Salvucci and Rawlings decisions in combination with
Rakas constitute a complete revision of the law of fourth amend-
ment standing.210 The possibility of impeachment, the talismanic
nature of the privacy test with its mechanistic factors and the elim-
ination of privacy interests all contribute to the narrowing of
fourth amendment rights. As a result, the effect of these changes
may be to limit the number of defendants able to pursue fourth
amendment claims.
204. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
205. 448 U.S. at 106.
206. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), as well as Jones and Simmons to support this position.
207. 448 U.S. at 106. See also notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
208. 448 U.S. at 105.
209. Id. at 119 (citations omitted).
210. See notes 113, 176 & 205 supra and accompanying text.
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A. Impeachment
The only protection now offered a defendant seeking to sup-
press evidence is that his or her testimony at the suppression hear-
ing will not be admissible against him or her in the prosecution's
case in chief.2 11 As Justice Marshall observed in Salvucci, this
protection is minimal since evidence still can be admitted for im-
'peachment purposes.2' Although the Court does not specifically
admit that such admissions will result, it appears ready to make
such an acknowledgement given the warning that Simmons may
not be used as a shield for false representations.213
Recent Supreme Court decisions also indicate that suppression
hearing testimony eventually may be admissible for impeachment
purposes. In United States v. Havens,2"4 the Court permitted the
use of illegally seized evidence, which had been successfully sup-
pressed, to impeach the defendant's testimony given in answer to
a question on cross-examination. 1 ' In reaching its decision, the
court in Havens relied heavily on Harris v. New York.216 Al-
though Harris concerned the use of a defendant's statements ob-
tained in violation of the fifth amendment for impeachment
purposes, the Court found its reasoning sufficiently analogous to
be applicable in Havens.2" 7 The Court in Havens reasoned that
"arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal sys-
tem." 8 Consonant with this goal, when a defendant takes the
witness stand on his or her own behalf, he or she is obligated to
testify truthfully or risk a perjury prosecution. 219 As the Harris
Court stated, "a defendant ought not to be allowed to perjure him-
self, while relying on the exclusionary rule to keep out evidence
proving his lack of credibility." 0 Furthermore, in United States
211. The Simmons test was retained by the Court in Salvucci and Rakas. See 448 U.S.
at 105; 439 U.S. at 135 n.4.
212. See notes 183-87 supra and accompanying text.
213. 448 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting) citing Justice Rehnquist's majority opin-
ion, 448 U.S. at 94 n.9.
214. 446 U.S. 620 (1980). In Havens, the defendant was arrested for possession of nar-
cotics upon reentering the United States from Peru. After successfully suppressing evi-
dence obtained in a search of his luggage, Havens took the witness stand on his own behalf
at trial. Statements made by Havens at the hearing on his motion to suppress were admit-
ted to impeach this testimony. Id. at 622.
215. Id. at 622-23.
216. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
217. 446 U.S. at 626.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 401 U.S. 225 (emphasis supplied). The exclusionary rule is the primary means of
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v. Kahan,221 a case involving sixth amendment issues, the Court
specifically concluded that "Simmons is not to be converted into a
license for false representations . . . free from the risk that the
claimant will be held accountable for his falsehood." 22
In other recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has not
approved the use of a defendant's suppression hearing testimony
for impeachment purposes. In New Jersey v. Tortash,223 for exam-
ple, the Court held that a defendant's testimony before a grand
jury under a grant of legislative immunity was not admissible to
impeach his or her testimony at a later criminal trial.2 24 The
Court reasoned that since immunized testimony "is the essence of
coerced testimony,""22 and because the fifth and fourteenth
amendments prohibit compelled self-incrimination, the grand jury
testimony was not admissible for any purpose.2 2 6 This situation
arguably is analogous to a standing situation in which the defen-
dant testifies at a suppression hearing under the implied immunity
grant of Simmons.227 The dictum in Salvucci, however, coupled
with the application of Harris to the fourth amendmdnt in Havens
and the Court's specific reference to Simmons in Kahan, indicates
that the "Court will eventually find that impeachment use of sup-
pression hearing testimony is permissible. '22 8
B. Factors of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
Both the constitutionally protected areas test and the auto-
matic standing tests of Jones were rejected as overly rigid, "talis-
manic" solutions to fourth amendment controversies.2 2 9 The
reasonable expectation of privacy test, however, offers an equally
unsatisfactory solution. After reviewing cases applying the rea-
enforcing fourth amendment rights. When a search or seizure is found to be unreasonable,
the evidence obtained through the illegal governmental behavior is inadmissible at trial.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
221. 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
222. Id. at 243. In Kahan, the defendant attempted to invoke Simmons to prevent the
admission of false statements he made at an arraignment concerning his ability to afford an
attorney. Thus, the real issue in Kahan was the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel.
223. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
224. Id. at 459-60.
225. Id. at 459.
226. Id. at 459-60.
227. Y. KAMISAR, W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 795 (5th
ed. 1980).
228. Bell, supra note 137, at 63. The Illinois Supreme Court already has made such a
determination. People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974).
229. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
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sonable expectation of privacy standard, one commentator re-
cently observed: "One can only wonder if constitutional
guarantees should hinge on such trivial considerations as the
tightness with which a container is sealed."23 The possibility that
repeated government intrusions may further reduce the individ-
ual's legitimate subjective expectations also is evidenced by Rakas
and Smith .23 1 The reasonable expectation of privacy test is mech-
anistic primarily because the Court has yet to define its basic theo-
retical components. The Court's decisions have focused on the
specific facts of each case, rather than on formulating an underly-
ing rationale.
In Katz, both the majority and Harlan's dissent emphasized
the specific activities of the defendant which evinced an intent to
maintain privacy-such as closing the phone booth door.232 In
Rakas, the defendants manifested an intent to conceal various
items from public view by placing them under the seat and in a
locked glove compartment.233 The Court held that the defendants
had no reasonable expectation of privacy, however, because of the
implicit lack of privacy in automobiles234 and because they did
not claim a possessory interest in the place searched.235 Although
Salvucci was remanded for a determination of the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy,236 its dicta-that possession is
not dispositive of an expectation of privacy-was adopted in
Rawlings.237 The Court in Rawlings also viewed the defendant's
activities as evidence of his subjective intent to maintain privacy.
The Court inquired into the defendant's ability to exclude others
from the hiding place2 38 and his subjective expectation of whether
the government would search his companion's purse.239
The factors culled from these cases as elements of the reason-
able expectation of privacy standard form a confusing list. The
list includes the defendant's activities to secure privacy, such as
planning, ability to exclude third parties, and physical manifesta-
230. The Supreme Court, supra note 154, at 203.
231. See notes 159-65 supra and accompanying text.
232. 389 U.S. at 347.
233. See notes 115 & 170 supra and accompanying text.
234. See notes 145-50 supra and accompanying text.
235. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
236. 448 U.S. at 95.
237. Id. at 104-05.
238. The ability to exclude also was discussed in Katz. See notes 130-31 supra and
accompanying text.
239. 448 U.S. at 104 n.3.
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tions of an intent to maintain privacy. The list also includes fac-
tors such as the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy, the
generic character of the place (houses versus automobiles) and the
defendant's possessory rights in the location searched. The impor-
tance of any given factor changes from case to case. It is difficult
to understand the Court's distinction between the supposedly nar-
row degree of privacy expectations in an automobile and the ap-
parently broad expectations in a public phone booth.24° In both
Katz and Rakas, however, the defendants physically manifested
an intent to be private. At this level, the only distinction which
explains the opposite result in the two cases is the Court's previous
determination that there was a reduced expectation of privacy in
an automobile.
C. Elimination of Property Interests
There is no question that even after Rawlings, possession will
be an important factor in determining standing for fourth amend-
ment claims. The Court in Rawlings, citing Rakas with ap-
proval,24' stated that possession may evince an expectation of
privacy.2 42 Rawlings holds, however, that a possessory interest is
merely one factor in determining an expectation of privacy. 243
The Court has recognized historically that fourth amendment
interests can be divorced totally from property rights.244 In cer-
tain instances, however, a property right alone has been sufficient
to establish a fourth amendment interest.245 Before Rawlings, the
Court had never precluded this latter possibility. Property inter-
ests traditionally have been considered the crux of fourth amend-
ment interests.246 When the Court initially recognized the
strength of the privacy interests protected by the fourth amend-
ment, it specifically endorsed the importance of property
interests.247
240. See notes 123-31 supra and accompanying text.
241. 448 U.S. at 104-05.
242. Id. at 105 ("ownership of the drugs is... one fact to be considered.").
243. Id. at 105-06.
244. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
245. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 259, 264. Jones' standing was based on his
possession of the narcotics and his rights in the premises searched. See notes 82-84 supra
and accompanying text.
246. See notes 39 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
247. Professor Amsterdam even has suggested that subsequent interpretations of the
Katz decision fail to "capture" its rationale when they rely solely on its protection of pri-
vacy to the exclusion of property. Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 385.
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The abandonment of property interests as creating a fourth
amendment right has, as Justice Marshall noted, "turned the de-
velopment of the law of search and seizure on its head." '248 The
fourth amendment protects citizens from a particular class of gov-
ernment activity-unreasonable search and seizure. As the Court
suggested in Katz, the individual's interests only are protected in
the negative-that is, to the extent that the government's activities
are unreasonable.249 Thus, whether the invaded interest is prop-
erty or privacy is irrelevant to the assertion of a fourth amend-
ment claim; all that should matter is that an individual's interest is
invaded. Factors such as whether the seized objects were in plain
view250 only are relevant to the reasonableness of a search, not to
whether an individual's interests have been invaded.
III. CONCLUSION
The ultimate effect of Rakas, Salvucci, and Rawlings is to limit
the number of individuals who may assert a fourth amendment
claim. Empirically, this notion is accurate since possessory and
property rights no longer will be considered determinative of a
fourth amendment interest. The fact that suppression hearing tes-
timony probably will be admissible against a defendant for im-
peachment purposes should the defendant choose to testify on his
or her own behalf, also will be a likely deterrent to the assertion of
fourth amendment claims. The present nature of the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard-with its mechanistic factors-is
undefined. None of these factors are essential to the standard, yet
any of them might be essential to a fourth amendment claim, thus
making standing more difficult to prove. The "talismanic" nature
of the expectation of privacy test also has been criticized as obviat-
ing the need for establishing an analytic framework for standing
analysis. These considerations establish that "[in] its present for-
mulation, fourth amendment doctrine hardly constitutes a bul-
wark against unwarranted governmental intrusion."'25'
ELIZABETH BARKER
248. 448 U.S. at 118-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
249. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
250. See note 59 supra (plain view doctrine).
251. The Supreme Court, supra note 154, at 202.
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